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ABSTRACT
Future unmanned space missions will require increased redundancy to failure. One such
mission is the Mars Sample Return, intended to return a sample of Martian soil, rock and
atmosphere to Earth for greater study. A key element of the Mars Sample Return mission is the
Mars Ascent Vehicle, which is designed to carry the sample container from the surface into Mars
orbit, where the sample will be transferred to the Earth return vehicle. The Mars Ascent Vehicle
is currently proposed as a two-stage solid fuel vehicle, which is ideal for surviving the long
interplanetary journey and environmental extremes of the Martian surface.
This thesis details real time failure detection, isolation and mitigation algorithms for use
with a six degree of freedom solid fuel reaction control system, which commonly functions by
burning a solid fuel gas generator and expelling gas out of valves arranged around the vehicle.
Valve failures are known to occur in spacecraft reaction control systems, and without on-board,
real time failure identification and mitigation, the Mars Ascent Vehicle could fail to place the
sample container in the proper orbit. The two failure modes which are considered here are
valves firing continuously, an on failure, or a valve not firing when commanded, an off failure.
The detection and isolation algorithm relies on comparing the expected with the actual change in
vehicle angular and linear rates in order to determine the disturbance acceleration that has been
applied to the vehicle. For an on failure, the mitigation algorithm works by commanding on the
jet which directly opposes the failed jet, and for an off failure, the failed jet is simply removed
from the available jets to be commanded.
The algorithms detailed here provide increased redundancy to failure and greater
robustness without the need for additional dedicated detection hardware and at minimal
computing load. These algorithms could also be adapted to other space vehicles and numerous
other applications.
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As space exploration continues in the current and foreseeable budget-constrained
environment, increasing emphasis will be placed on unmanned robotic exploration missions.
These missions will require significant robustness to failure, both in hardware design and in
control software.
One proposed mission of particular interest to the scientific community is the Mars
Sample Return (MSR) mission. The three key elements of the proposed mission are: a rover or
lander to collect samples from the Mars surface, a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV) to carry the
sample into Mars orbit, and an Earth return phase to carry the sample back to Earth. The three
phases would likely be launched from Earth in at least two separate launches in order to
minimize the mass of each launch.[1] The MAV will be required to endure a long mission from
Earth launch to Mars ascent, possibly as long as two years, including a stay of up to 90 sols on
the Martian surface. The long duration in space and the high and low temperature extremes of
the Martian surface would be challenging, and would require significant thermal protection for
typical liquid spacecraft propellants. Therefore, under many current design proposals, the MAV
would be a solid-fuel spacecraft in order to cope with the temperature extremes.
Solid fuel vehicles have several advantages. They are relatively stable for long term
storage, and start up more reliably than liquid fuel systems following long duration exposure to
temperature and pressure extremes. Solid fuel systems suitable for surviving the long duration
and extreme environment exist; several have significant space heritage. Comparable liquid fuel
systems, which could be expected to survive the long mission and harsh environment, are still in
development and have much less, if any, space heritage.[ 1] The primary disadvantage of a solid
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fuel vehicle is that it cannot be turned on and off, and must fire continuously from ignition until
all fuel is expended. Solid fuel vehicles or vehicle stages are typically used for shorter
operational duration, typically measured in minutes instead of hours or even weeks or years for
some liquid-fuel systems. The current budget challenges that the U.S. space program is
experiencing mean that if humans want to explore Mars, the moon, and other planets, it will
likely need to be with automated spacecraft, not manned. Mars is a minimum of 4.3 light-
minutes from Earth, which means a minimum of 8.6 minutes round trip for a signal from Mars to
Earth and back to Mars. For almost any spacecraft, this is far too long to rely on Earth-based
decision making in the event of a critical component failure. The mission could be a complete
loss even before mission control knows there is a problem. Therefore, a system must be in place
for autonomous onboard failure detection and isolation (FDI) and failure mitigation. At the very
least, such a system could detect and mitigate the problem until mission control can issue new
commands. Even for a spacecraft in Earth or Moon orbit, autonomous real time failure detection
and mitigation provides significant benefits.
This thesis details algorithms for autonomous, real time propulsion failure detection,
isolation and mitigation. The mitigation algorithms are designed for solid fuel spacecraft, where
thrusters cannot simply be shut off when they fail. Also, the only sensor these algorithms require
is an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), which is already present on nearly any spacecraft; they
require no additional hardware modifications. Hardware modifications and hardware
redundancy can be very expensive, and adding these algorithms provides increased redundancy
with minimal extra cost.
Another advantage is that these algorithms are simple enough for real time operation in
processing-constrained space systems. This is particularly relevant for a long duration and
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performance-critical system such as the MAV, where any computer system must be durable and
radiation hard, and therefore computing power is limited. Cosmic radiation that exists naturally
in space can cause upsets and faults in silicon-based computer systems. Most vulnerable are
memory devices, where a radiation particle can upset individual memory bits and swap a one for
a zero, or vice versa, or even damage the circuitry permanently. Most systems could survive at
least one upset, however multiple upsets could quickly degrade computing performance. Space-
qualified computer systems must be hardened against radiation damage through a variety of
methods. If a vehicle system requires a more radiation resistant computer, then the original
component technology on which the computer is based will be older, and therefore it will be
slower and have less memory capacity. A mission such as MSR and the MAV will require
significant radiation protection, and because of this will have severely limited memory storage
and computing capability, of which failure detection and mitigation will only be allowed a small
portion. Limiting the computing and storage load of the algorithms described in this thesis
provides significant benefits to the mission design and allows them to be implemented with
minimal extra cost or time.
1.2 Vehicle Description
For the MAV, a solid fuel lifting stage is not unlikely in any design, and parallels many
small and medium payload Earth launch lifting vehicles, such as the Orbital Sciences' Pegasus
and Minotaur launch vehicles, and NASA's Scout Rocket. In the current design, the second
stage of the MAV would be a solid rocket booster with a small liquid reaction control system
(RCS) for attitude control. One topic that may be of interest is to use solid instead of liquid fuel
for the RCS, in order to increase reliability and temperature survivability; however, this poses
additional challenges. Solid fuel systems cannot be throttled on and off like liquid propellant
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systems. One common method for solid fuel RCS is to use solid fuel gas generators, where the
gas is released through valves at various points around the vehicle in order to exert desired forces
and torques on the vehicle. An example of this is the Orion Launch Abort System Attitude
Control Motor [2] developed for NASA's Orion program.
A particular challenge for solid-fuel RCS using a gas generator is that the system pressure
must be regulated. The gases must be directed from the gas generator, through the vehicle and
out to the valves. The vehicle could explode from over-pressure, and too low pressure would
result in loss of vehicle control authority from decreased thrust. Solid fuel RCS can experience
thruster failures just like liquid fuel systems, however the inability to halt solid fuel combustion
on command makes dealing with the thruster failure more difficult. [3] On a liquid-fuel system,
the fuel supply to a stuck jet can simply be stopped, ending the failure. Liquid fuel systems also
require pressure control; however, this is usually implemented in the fuel tanks and is
independent of jet firings. Therefore pressure control has much less impact on maintaining
vehicle control authority and the mitigation of a jet failure in a liquid fuel RCS than it does in a
solid fuel RCS. Both of these issues make failure detection and mitigation more difficult on a
solid-fuel vehicle than a liquid-fuel vehicle.
While slightly different from the current MAV second stage, the hypothetical test vehicle
for this research was chosen to show the validity of the research algorithms and maintain
applicability to a wide of vehicles in six degree of freedom applications. The hypothetical
vehicle has sixteen jets in eight opposed pairs, capable of controlling motion in any degree of
freedom. The vehicle's mass properties are assumed to be well known. The detection algorithm
and vehicle mass property estimates could be updated with any change in mass properties from
known sources. Mass property changes from fuel depletion are well characterized, and solid fuel
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means no disturbances from fluid motion. For the Mars Sample Return mission, the sample
mass properties will not be known exactly, however the vehicle could use methods such as in [4]
and [5], or the mass properties could be measured prior to launch by the rover system.
The environment of operation will be assumed to be free space with minimal
disturbances acting on the vehicle. It will be assumed that a previous boost stage placed the
vehicle on the necessary trajectory for Mars orbit. The system considered in this test case will be
responsible for fine-tuning the orbit and maneuvering the sample for docking with the Earth
return stage. The following assumptions will be made about the vehicle failure modes. First,
only one jet failure will occur at any one time; multiple simultaneous failures are outside the
scope of this thesis. Also, the two failure modes considered will be valves stuck on and stuck
off. Stuck on represents that the valve is firing at 100% thrust at all times while failed. Stuck off
means that the valve does not fire when commanded, i.e. it has a thrust level of 0% at all times.
These will also be referred to as on and off failures respectively. The terms valve, thruster and
jet will be used interchangeably in this thesis to represent the valves which expel gas to exert
force on the vehicle. Also, as the failures are considered to occur exclusively when a valve has
stuck in one of two orientations, the terms stuck valve and jet or thruster failure will be used with
the same meaning.
Two additional failure modes to be aware of are partial on failures and off-nominal
thrust. Partial on failure is when a valve is stuck on, but firing at less than 100% and more than
0% thrust at all times, regardless of command. Off-nominal thrust may be thought of as a partial
off failure, where a valve fires at less than 100% thrust when it is commanded, but still fires only
when commanded. The reader should be aware of these failure modes, however they will not be
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fully discussed in this work and a complete detection and mitigation scheme has not been
developed for these failures.
1.3 Relevance and Thesis Outline
This research is primarily focused on space systems, however it is applicable to a wide
range of research areas. The failure detection method detailed here could be applied to nearly
any vehicle. The basic concept is easily transferable, comparing expected with actual motion
and determining the disturbance experienced by the vehicle. This disturbance signature can then
be compared to a set of expected failure modes to determine the likelihood of each particular
failure. The mitigation strategy could also be applied to vehicles with non-opposing thrusters.
This would require significant controllability analysis for each vehicle and all possible thruster
failures and combinations, but it would be possible to predefine which opposing thruster(s)
should be fired if a particular thruster suffered an on failure. A slightly different application of
these algorithms could also be used to determine thrust levels for a vehicle, in order to improve
control efficiency and accuracy. [5]
Chapter 2 explains the design and options for the chosen fault tolerant controller on
which these detection and mitigation algorithms are based. Chapter 3 of this thesis details the
Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm, including available algorithm options, the chosen
algorithm, and methods for simultaneously detecting either a stuck off or stuck on valve failure.
Chapter 4 explains the Failure Mitigation Algorithms, including valve isolation, disturbance
mitigation, and updating the jet selection algorithms to accommodate the stuck valve. Chapter 5
contains the simulation description and research results. Chapter 6 is the Conclusion and also
details options for future work.
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2.0 Control Law and Jet Selection Algorithm
Selection of the vehicle autopilot controller is crucial to the development of detection and
mitigation algorithms. These control elements must work together to create a robust and well
controlled, high performing vehicle. Throughout the course of the research associated with this
thesis, numerous problems were encountered when the autopilot controller was conflicting with
elements of the detection or mitigation algorithms. For optimal performance it is necessary that
the autopilot controller should also be fault tolerant and have some built in robustness to
disturbance. One type of typical spacecraft autopilot is divided into two pieces, the control law
and the jet selection algorithm. The two elements of the control system are highly coupled, and
unless commands are executed in the correct order and the correct signals are communicated
between the two algorithms, the entire system can perform in undesirable and unpredictable
ways. Therefore it is necessary to discuss the vehicle control law and jet selection before
detailing the failure identification and mitigation algorithms which are the focus of this thesis.
2.1 Phase Space Vehicle Control Law
For this research, a phase space method has been selected for use as the control law,
based on [5], [6] and [7]. This particular phase space control law has been shown to be effective
at controlling vehicle attitude and linear velocity for a spacecraft using RCS control. The
primary elements of the control law are: the velocity to be gained vector, the multi-dimensional
phase space, and the state deadband.
2.1.1 Velocity to be Gained
The velocity to be gained vector is essentially a desired rate change vector calculated
from the current state and the desired state. For a vehicle with a state vector x, which has a
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derivative *_, the vehicle desired state is x and the desired rate is x'. An augmented rate change
vector, called the velocity to be gained, is defined as:
Wi = C -Unit (x_ - x_) + (x'd - D) (2-1)
The component unit(x - x) is the unit magnitude direction which drives the vehicle
from the current state to the desired state. The scalar value c is called the convergent velocity,
and (xj - x) defines the desired change in vehicle rate. It can be seen that when the vehicle rate
equals the desired rate, the only correction is to vehicle position, and when the vehicle position
equals the desired position, the only change is to vehicle rate. In this way both position and
velocity can be accurately controlled in any dimension. Because errors exist in any system, the
relative position and velocity to the target cannot be precisely known or controlled. It is also not
possible to effect the rate change instantaneously. Both of these limitations mean that frequent
calculation of velocity to be gained will result in frequently changing requests. Therefore it is
necessary to incorporate deadbands into the control law in order to produce a reasonable and
feasible controller.
2.1.2 Phase Space Deadband Concept
Consider a vehicle described as above, with a new vector x, defined as:
x..e =-- x- xA (2-2)
where the vector has j dimensions, as many as the vehicle has states. It is necessary to control
each state in order to keep the each within its defined deadband. The deadband dbt for each state
is the region of space within which the state is acceptably close to the desired value. Assuming
that the deadband for each state is symmetrical, that is that dbi+ equals dbi-, then to determine if
the vehicle is within its deadband, it is necessary to compare only xet and db. If xei is greater
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than db1 , the state is outside its deadband. The space described by the j state deadbands can be
visualized as a j-dimensional prism. In order to equalize vehicle control in disparate dimensions,
such as when the deadband for linear control may be much greater numerically than that for
rotation, it is reasonable to normalize the deadbands. The normalized j-dimensional prism
becomes a hypercube, within which a hypersphere, a sphere of greater than three dimensions,
can be inscribed. The easiest test for whether the vehicle has exceeded its normalized deadband
is to compare two scalar values:
J-ie -X& <ry (2-3)
where e is the normalized state vector, and ry, is the radius of the hypersphere. This
hypersphere shall be called the "phase sphere."
2.1.3 Phase Space Control Law
The phase space control law is the combination of the velocity to be gained vector and
the phase sphere concept into one simple, robust control law. As described above, it is necessary
to normalize the individual state deadbands dbi. This is primarily because they may have
significantly different numerical values. The deadband for control of translation may be 10
meters, however the deadband for rotational control may be only 0.5 degree. Calculating the
convergent velocity along (xa - _x) only would direct the vehicle along the numerically largest
error, not along the state which is furthest outside its deadband. That is, the controller would not
focus on the state which most needs to be corrected and may seriously over control certain states
which happen to be measured in units which result in greater numerical values. Typically this
would result in over controlling translation at the expense of rotation. Therefore the phase space
control law uses an augmented velocity to be gained principle which directs the convergent
velocity along Ie:
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_W = -c -unit(Xe) + ( -d ) (2-4)
where c is determined based upon where R, is relative to the state deadbands.
There are several characteristics of the phase space control law which are worthy of
discussion. First, the control law displays limit cycling behavior. Limit cycling is defined as the
oscillation of a system about its desired state, due to an inability to precisely control the system
states to the desired value without relative rate. The primary cause of limit cycle behavior is that
thrusters have a finite minimum impulse which they can produce, and therefore once the vehicle
has been driven into the deadband, it is not possible to precisely drive the relative rate to zero.
Therefore, even in the nominal case, limit cycles will occur. Limit cycling can also result from
outside disturbances and control or feedback imperfections. As a vehicle is disturbed away from
its desired state, control will be applied to return it to the desired value. It may overshoot the
state, or disturbances may push it past the desired state, and therefore more control will have to
be applied to return to the desired state. This is limit cycling. If a vehicle achieves its target
state, but still has a relative rate for that state, then it will likely limit cycle about that desired
state.
As a position state reaches its deadband with a nonzero rate, the rate must then be
reversed to push the state back towards its desired value. Because it is impossible to
instantaneously change the rate when the state reaches the edge of the deadband, it is necessary
to define a second phase sphere within the first. The size of the inner phase sphere is set so that
any state variable may be corrected after passing this sphere, but before exceeding the outer
deadband. The magnitude of the inner phase sphere will likely be different in each dimension,
even in normalized space, because the control modes and level of control authority will often be
different for each dimension and its associated effectors. The entire hyper-dimensional space
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can be divided into three regions based on the two phase spheres. If the vehicle states are within
the inner sphere, the vehicle is in region 1. If the states are within the outer sphere but outside
the inner sphere, that is region 2, and outside the outer sphere is region 3.
The final consideration is to set the value of c based on the vehicle's location in the phase
space regions. If the vehicle is in region 3, then c will be set reasonably high to achieve an
acceptably fast convergence rate. If the vehicle is in region 1 or 2, then c will be set to a
reasonable limit cycle rate. Too slow of a limit cycle rate may be difficult for the vehicle to
achieve, such as if it is below the minimum impulse achievable by a jet, and too fast of a limit
cycle will result in extraneous jet firings and unnecessarily frequent vehicle departures from
regions 1 and 2. When coming from region 3, a braking rate change is applied to counteract the
tendency of the vehicle to overshoot the target and reenter regions 2 or 3. Figure 2-1 shows a
convergence trajectory in a two dimensional phase space, and Figure 2-2 shows a limit cycling






Figure 2-1: Convergence Trajectory
X2
X,
Figure 2-2: Two-Sided Limit Cycle
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2.1.4 One-Sided Limit Cycle
The final noteworthy characteristic of the phase space controller is its limit cycling
behavior in the presence of a disturbance acceleration. A typical limit cycle is two-sided,
meaning that as a state is corrected back towards its desired value and overshoots, it will then
likely exceed its dimension on the inner phase sphere on the side opposite its previous excursion.
When a disturbance is acting on a vehicle state, that state will display one-sided limit cycling
behavior, shown in Figure 2-3. p represents the disturbance acceleration, whether from a failed






Figure 2-3: One-Sided Limit Cycle
The one-sided limit cycle behavior occurs because as the vehicle exerts temporary control
to drive the state from region 2 back into region 1, the disturbance will again push the state back
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towards region 2 as soon as control is reduced inside region 1. Over time the axis of the limit
cycle will move so that it is oscillating nearly directly along the direction of the disturbance.
These principles can easily be applied to spacecraft control, where x and x d can be
defined to contain whichever vehicle states are to be controlled. Most commonly this will be the
six dimensions of angular and linear position, as is the case in this research. Whenever the
vehicle is in regions 2 or 3, or enters region 2 from region 1, a new rate change request is
generated and a command is sent to the jet selection algorithm to generate a new set of jet
commands and firing times to meet the rate change request. In order to stabilize the control and
avoid excessive control oscillations, even if the vehicle remains in regions 2 or 3, a new rate
change request and associate jet selection will not be made until the previous jet selection has
been fully executed, that is, until the jets have stopped firing.
2.2 Jet Selection and Linear Programming
One of the most powerful and capable methods for jet selection in a multi-jet vehicle is
linear programming. As shown in [8], jet selection for a multi-jet system can be expressed and
solved as a linear programming problem, and it is useful to begin with this method in order to
explain the nature of the problem.
2.2.1 Linear Programming Formulation
The generic linear programming problem has three characteristics: a linear objective
function which is to be minimized or maximized, a set of linear constraints which must be met
(typically equalities or inequalities), and all variables are bounded to be non-negative. This
formulation lends itself well to the selection of jets for a multi-jet spacecraft. The objective
function to be maximized or minimized is defined as:
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f (x) = c1x1 + c2x 2 + + cnxn (2-5)
Where ci is a constant weight, such as the rate of fuel expended by firing a jet, and xi is the
selection variable, such as the jet firing time. The objective function is also referred to as the
cost function, where all ci can be visualized as the cost of each xi. This function is subject to the
constraints
Ax = w (2-6)
and
xi > 0, for all i (2-7)
where Equation (2-6) is also referred to as the equality constraint, and Equation (2-7) is an
inequality constraint.
The set of solutions to a linear programming problem, that is, all the possible values of x
which satisfy the constraints, form a convex set. Any set of equalities or inequalities such as
Equations (2-6) and (2-7) will only create a convex set. A convex set is defined as a set such
that a segment joining any two points in the set is also in the set. A simple example of this can












Figure 2-5: Non-Convex Set
It is possible to find two points such as A and B in Figure 2-5 for which the segment between
them is not completely within the set. There are no such two points in Figure 2-4.
An optimal solution to the linear programming problem will be found at an extreme point
on the set. An extreme point is any point which is not on a segment between any two other
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points. Points A and B in Figure 2-4 are both extreme points. Point A is the point which
minimizes xi and Point B is the point that maximizes x 2. Changing the values of any variable at
an extreme point changes the value of the objective function. The optimal extremum is that
point which has the most optimal value of the objective function. Other points within the set
may result in the same value of f(x) as the optimal extremum, however at no point will the cost
function have a more optimal value. Therefore, searching only the extreme points of a set gives
the linear programming solver a finite number of solutions to check. It is obvious that, as a
problem expands beyond two dimensions, the number of extreme points grows prohibitively
large and becomes time or computationally intensive to check all extrema individually.
Therefore it is beneficial to use algorithms which limit the number of points to check.
2.2.2 The Simplex Method
The Simplex method is one such method of linear programming which limits the number
of points which are to be checked. The basic concept is that the Simplex method proceeds from
one extremum only to other extrema that improve the objective function, that is, to extrema with
more optimal (higher or lower) cost. In order to explain the Simplex algorithm, it is necessary to
first define several terms.
A solution is any vector x which satisfies the equality constraints of Equation (2-6). If it
also satisfies the inequality constraints of Equation (2-7), it is a feasible solution. A basic
feasible solution is a feasible solution c which has only as many nonzero elements as equality
constraints imposed on the problem. In jet selection, this means that c has only as many nonzero
elements as degrees of freedom which are to be controlled. If the activity vectors x which
correspond to these nonzero elements of c span the selection space, then they form a basis of a
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finite dimensional vector space. This means that any vector x can be represented as a linear
combination of the basis vectors x-.
The Simplex method starts with any basic feasible solution and seeks to replace vectors
in the basis with other vectors which are not currently in the basis. The method improves cost by
adding vectors to the basis, but must maintain the solution feasibility when removing any current
basis vectors. The steps are repeated until an optimal solution is found, or the algorithm
determines that no other feasible solutions exist, i.e. the current solution is the best possible
solution. It is necessary to define the two major rules of Simplex, which decide how vectors are
eliminated from the basis, or excluded, and also how they are added into the basis, or included.
In Simplex, the solution is always maintained as a basic feasible solution, and therefore
for every vector which is included, another must be excluded. The first rule is to obtain a new
basis and a new feasible solution by including 2 into the basis in the place of some vector b(i)
currently in the basis, as long as b(i) is selected to maintain the feasibility of the solution. This is
determined by adding a slack vector to the basis, and then determining the first basis vector b(i)
which can be set to zero to maintain the feasibility of the solution.
The second rule details how a vector should be included into the basis. Let n be the
number of elements in x, and q be the number of inequalities in Equation (2-6) and x is the new
vector which is to be tested for inclusion in the basis with corresponding cost c. By adding the
new vector, Equation (2-5) can be updated as follows:
q-1
f )= ch + cjx; (2-8)
The first term is for i = 1 to q - 1 because in the previous step one basis vector b(i) has been
eliminated from the basis. If the objective function f(x) is to be minimized, then the first vector
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x; which decreases f(x) is subsequently included in the basis. If the objective function f(x) is
to be maximized, then the first vector x; which increases f(x) is subsequently included in the
basis. The process continues until no vector can be found which will either increase or decrease
f (x) whichever is desired, beyond the current value. This method can also be visualized as
beginning with the basic feasible solution, progressing to the first available extremum, and then
moving along an edge of the set from the first extremum to another extremum of more optimal
cost.
2.2.3 Applying Linear Programming to Jet Selection
As previously mentioned, jet selection for a multi-jet system can be solved as a linear
programming problem. This section details a common application of linear programming to jet
selection.
Paired with the chosen phase space control law, the purpose of the jet selection is to
achieve the desired rate change W with the available selection of jets. In the linear programming
problem, the jets are represented by their activity vectors, which make up the basis. The jet
activity vector represents the acceleration achieved by firing jet j. In implementation this can
also be represented as the change in angular and translational body rates achieved by firing jet j
for unit time. The six-element activity vector a is given by the following equation:
I- - (r x T)
aj ... (2-9)
T/m
where r is the displacement from the vehicle center of mass to the jet and T is the jet thrust
vector. The vehicle mass is represented by m and I1 is the inverse of the vehicle's three-
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dimensional inertia matrix. The first three elements of the activity vector represent rotational
acceleration and the last three elements represent linear or translational acceleration. A key
assumption here is that the second-order terms of a1 are negligibly small. Because the state
measurements and estimates provided by the IMU are assumed to be very good, especially over
short periods, this is a logical and acceptable approximation.
Having defined the selection basis, it is next necessary to define the objective function
which is to be optimized. The following sections discuss likely options for objective functions,
associated challenges and alternate linear programming formulations in greater detail. A
common objective is to minimize fuel usage, for which the objective function f(x) is defined as:
#jets
f (x) = xifi (2-10)
i=1
where xi is the jet firing time and fi is the jet's rate of fuel consumption. Because no jet can be
fired for a negative time, the corresponding inequality constraint is:
x i  0 for all i (2-11)





A realistically solvable problem requires three things. First, the cost function must be
linear and have a minimum, which makes the problem achievable and ensures that the cost
function is useful in a linear programming formulation. Second, the equality constraints must
allow for one or several solutions, ensuring that the desired rate change request can be achieved
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with the given effectors (jets). Finally, the inequality constraints must be met by one or more of
these solutions, where the goal is to achieve the desired rate change request in a reasonable time.
2.2.4 Time and Fuel Optimal Formulation
There are several possible formulations of the objective function f(x) which may be used
with the linear programming solver and optimization. The most common is typically minimum
fuel optimization, especially in liquid fuel vehicles. In a liquid fuel system, minimizing fuel
usage increases the achievable mission lifetime. For a solid fuel system such as the MAV, fuel
consumption cannot be controlled to a level which would significantly contribute to mission
lifetime. Simulation has shown, however, that the minimum fuel formulation works acceptably
well for this research, and will be detailed in Chapter 5.
An alternative formulation is to minimize the vehicle reaction time, e.g. to minimize the
maximum of all the jet firing times. For the minimum time solution, the objective function f(x)
is defined as:
f(x) =max (xi) (2-13)
Therefore the linear programming solver seeks to find the solution which accomplishes the
desired rate change request in the minimum time. In most cases, this will be the solution which
fires the greatest number of jets simultaneously. In many cases this may be desirable, such as
when a vehicle is maneuvering rapidly, however this may not always be true. There may be
times, for instance when performing delicate or fine maneuvers such as docking or payload
release, it is not desirable to have a high number of jets firing at the same time. Therefore, this
formulation likely should not be used at all times for a spacecraft autopilot.
26
In certain modes of operation, however, it may be desirable to accomplish the minimum
time maneuver, or to optimize for a combination of time, fuel or another criteria. An example
combined objective function would be:
#je t s
f(x) = xifi + g -max (xi) (2-14)
Where g is a weighting coefficient which can be set as appropriate for the application.
Obviously a higher value of g would increase the weighting on the minimum time element and
cause the solver to more heavily focus on minimizing the vehicle reaction time. A lower value
of g would cause the fuel minimization element of the problem to take precedence.
Another possible formulation would be to make the objective function simply a linear
combination of individual variables xt, such as:
f(x) = g -x1 + h -x 2 + k -x 4  (2-15)
where g, h and k are weighting coefficients. This problem can be understood as an adaptation or
simplification of the above minimum fuel optimization, where g, h and k would be considered
as the associated fuel bum rates for jets 1, 2 and 4. It is possible to conceive an example where it
may be desirable only to optimize the fuel used by a specific set of jets, such as if they used an
expensive or scarce fuel. Just as above, increasing the value of any coefficient relative to the
others will increase that term's weight in the objective function, and therefore cause the linear
programming solver to optimize the associated variable more heavily.
Such decisions on weighting of disparate elements or combining different types of
objectives in the objective function require a thorough analysis of vehicle dynamics and the
impacts of the different linear programming formulations on autopilot behavior. Therefore
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optimization combinations will not be considered for this research, but is useful for discussion
and understanding the function of the linear programming solver.
2.2.5 Regular and Upper Bound Simplex
In choosing a linear programming solver it is important to understand both the
capabilities and limitations of the available solvers. The regular Simplex method as described
above is very efficient, however it can only select as many jets as degrees of freedom which are
to be controlled. In order to understand this limitation, consider a brief example where the
Simplex method is being used to control motion for the hypothetical MAV, but only in three
degrees of freedom. As in Figure 2-6, if the desired rate change is in the +X direction only, there
are four jets which exert force and cause acceleration in the +X direction. The time optimal
solution would be to fire all four jets simultaneously, exerting the most amount of force over the
shortest time. Regular Simplex, however, would only select a maximum of three jets (the same
number as the degrees of freedom it is controlling), and possibly only two jets if the third jet
would create conflicting torques on the vehicle.
28
Figure 2-6
An altered version of the Simplex method, called Upper Bound Simplex, is capable of
selecting more jets than degrees of freedom. In this formulation there is also a maximum value,
an upper bound, that the selection variables (the jet firing times xj ) may not exceed. This is an
additional inequality constraint on the problem:
x < x., for alli (2-16)
The primary means of altering Simplex to include the upper bound condition is to change
the way variables are incorporated into and excluded from the basis. This is done by considering
both whether the proposed variable change improves the objective function, and what the current
value of the variable is relative to its upper and lower boundaries. Another method is detailed by
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Crawford in [8], which shows how the regular Simplex method may be adapted to find the time
optimal solution using slack variables and a magnified rate change request.
2.2.6 Chosen Linear Programming Formulation
The primary difference between the optimization options and versions of the Simplex
method would be in which jets are fired, how often and for how long. As any formulation must
satisfy the equality constraint, such as Equation (2-6), to match the desired rate change request
vector, every formulation should create the same end result within a reasonable amount of time.
The greatest difference will come in the system pressure, which changes significantly based on
how many jets are fired. Pressure control is not considered in this thesis, and algorithm
adaptations or additional control elements would be required in order to control pressure.
Therefore it is not possible to fully analyze the impact of the different linear programming
solvers on the final vehicle. A reasonable choice can be made, however, in order to enable the
stuck valve detection and mitigation work which is the focus of this thesis.
The version of the Simplex method that will be used for this research is regular Simplex
solving the optimal fuel problem. The primary reason for choosing the fuel optimal formulation
is that is tends to fire a minimum of jets. The foundation of the detection algorithm is to predict
the expected change in vehicle motion, measure the actual change, and if the difference is great
enough it can be attributed to a failure of one or more jets. Firing fewer jets increases the
probability of success for the detection and mitigation algorithms, because the fewer jets that are
fired, the less often the motion prediction will change. Firing fewer jets also means that vehicle
rates will likely oscillate less and change less rapidly, which decreases the chances that higher-
order vehicle dynamics will become significant and distort the predicted motion. Also, as will be
discussed in the mitigation section, a stuck on failure will deplete pressure very rapidly, and
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firing an opposing jet will decrease pressure and therefore vehicle control authority even more
quickly. Solving for the minimum fuel solution would likely help to decrease the impact of this
in the final vehicle, and is therefore a likely choice when implementing a solution that would
include pressure control.
2.3 Jet Selection Algorithm Options and Previous Research
The following options were also considered for use as the jet selection algorithm. First, a
method could be implemented similar to the Space Shuttle On-Orbit Autopilot, which is detailed
in [9] and [10]. The Shuttle jet selection algorithm for the primary RCS jets is specifically
tailored to the Shuttle vehicle, and is based on lookup tables and extensive thought experiments
to determine which jets shall be fired to accomplish specific maneuvers or rate changes. As
designed and implemented the jet selection tables are two-fault tolerant, able to maintain control
of the vehicle in the presence of any two jet failures. There is some redundancy beyond two
faults, however there are cases of three faults in which the vehicle would be unable to control
motion in all six degrees of freedom. Also, the number of lookup tables required to maintain
controllability for three or more failures becomes significantly unwieldy. The original space
shuttle had a redundant set of five flight computers, which were not capable of carrying all
necessary data for the entire mission. At launch, four computers carried launch data, and one
would carry the abort data to return the shuttle and crew safely to the surface if a problem
occurred in transit to orbit. Throughout the mission, successive computer modules such as on-
orbit control and reentry had to be loaded one at a time, as they were needed. Given these
computational and memory storage limitations, the table lookup approach as detailed above was
necessary and also very successful. This approach would, however require a prohibitive amount
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of effort to replicate for another vehicle. Therefore an alternative method for jet selection will be
used in this research.
Another method is as published by Glandorf in "An Innovative Approach to the Solution
of a Family of Linear Programming Problems" [11]. The family of linear programming
problems that Glandorf is referring to includes the problem of jet selection for a six degree of
freedom multi-jet spacecraft, again as shown by [8]. The key insight is to separate the
calculation of rate change vectors, lists of jets to fire, and inverse basis matrices (arranged into
sets of basis solutions) from the selection of the optimal solution for the given rate change
request. In this way, basis solutions can be pre-calculated for a given set of vehicle
configurations. These solutions can be stored in memory, and thereby decrease the real-time
computation load on a vehicle's onboard processor, because the processor must only select from
a given set of options instead of performing the entire linear programming search.
If we briefly assume that the vehicle mass properties are constant, one set of solutions
would be stored in memory for the nominal case, and one set would be stored for each failure
mode for each jet; two failure modes per jet for sixteen jets makes thirty-two more solution sets,
and thirty-three total. In a relatively stable case, this method provides an advantage over typical
linear programming methods, and remains within reasonable memory limitations. As more
complications are added, however, the memory requirements increase significantly and the
benefit decreases. Changing mass properties, for instance, require separate basis solutions, and
so do extra failure modes. This method also does not take advantage of the computational
benefit of opposed jet pairs, as [7] does. Therefore the method in [11] will not be used in this
research.
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Reference [7], "Precise Nulling of Attitude and Motion Errors of a Spacecraft Using a
Phase Space Autopilot" by Kellogg, details a computationally simple method for calculating on
times for a defined set of jets using the pseudo inverse technique, referring to a method of matrix
manipulation for non-square matrices. Kellogg showed that the pseudo inverse jet selection
worked acceptably well only for vehicles with opposed pairs of jets. The reason is that the
pseudo-inverse is primarily just a matrix manipulation, and therefore can produce negative firing
times. In a vehicle with directly opposed jets, a negative firing time for one jet can simply be
inverted and added to its opposing jet. Also, even with directly opposed pairs, the pseudo
inverse method can result in a singular matrix, meaning that the desired vehicle rate change
request cannot be achieved with the available jets. This approach would work for the MAV as
described, but would not work for a different vehicle without directly opposed thrusters. Also,
once a jet fails, there is no longer a complete set of directly opposed thrusters. When this occurs
some of the necessary matrix manipulations lose full rank, and which increases the likelihood of
creating a singular matrix or an unsolvable request. Therefore the pseudo-inverse jet selection
method will not be used here because it limits the extension of this work beyond one
hypothetical test case and might over-constrain the failure mitigation algorithm.
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2.4 Fault Tolerant Autopilot Controller
The combination of Simplex with the phase space control law was test-flown successfully
on the Space Shuttle, and is commonly referred to as the Orbital Experiment (OEX) Digital
Autopilot (DAP).[12] This method has several advantages over those examined above. Simplex
does not require predefined sets of jets and failure modes, as is necessary in [11]. On most
modem space-qualified computers, common implementations of the Simplex method can be
expected to perform all calculations in flight. Linear programming in general and Simplex as a
subset of that can accommodate a wider range of possible configurations than the pseudo-inverse
method. Simplex can handle in-flight, real time changes in jet thrust levels and vehicle mass
properties without any changes to the problem formulation; the variables need only be updated as
available. Within a reasonable level of expectation, Simplex will calculate the necessary jets to
fire in order to achieve the desired rate change, if it is possible. The phase space autopilot, as
detailed above, is also very robust to disturbances and as long as the vehicle thrusters are capable
of counteracting the disturbance, the vehicle will simply limit cycle within its deadband and will
not lose control. This autopilot configuration provides an optimal combination of robustness and
flexibility without excess real time computation load or memory burden. Therefore, this
approach will be used for the hypothetical MAV in this research.
34
3.0 Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm
3.1 Algorithm Heritage and Options
This work is based on previous research conducted at the Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory and elsewhere into detecting spacecraft thruster failures. Three previous works in
particular will be discussed here. First is Reference [13] "Mass Property Estimation with Jet
Failure Identification for Control of Asymmetrical Satellites" by Levy. Levy's work begins with
estimating mass properties of a vehicle using an adaptation of the Extended Kalman Filter. As
an extension of his work he is able to estimate jet thrust levels using the residuals from the mass
property estimations. The strengths and weaknesses of this approach are largely the same as
those of the Kalman Filter. The strengths include that by nature it is relatively insensitive to
noise perturbation, and that the Kalman filter provides the optimal linear estimate of the vehicle
states. The greatest weakness is that it is computationally intensive, and would likely be
achievable but burdensome on a vehicle such as the MAV. Implementation for this case would
be a slightly simpler version of Levy's work, because the mass properties are assumed to be well
known. For failure detection, only the residual jet thrust estimation elements of the reference
would be implemented. Levy's algorithm could also be used to estimate the mass properties of
the MAV and the returning sample in real time in-flight.
The second is Reference [14] "Maximum Likelihood Failure Detection Techniques
Applied to the Shuttle RCS Jets" by Deyst and Deckert. The authors use only the gimbal angle
and linear velocity measurements available from the Space Shuttle orbiter IMU. The IMU
measurements are incorporated into a steady-state constant covariance (fixed gain) Kalman filter
to produce estimates of angular and linear disturbance acceleration. If the disturbance
acceleration is great enough, the jet failure detection algorithm is triggered. The estimated
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disturbance acceleration is then compared to the expected acceleration from each jet, which
produces a likelihood estimate that each jet has failed. Assuming that only one jet has failed at a
given moment, the jet with the greatest likelihood of failure exceeding a preset threshold is
assumed to have failed.
Another relevant previous work is Reference [15] "Robust Failure Detection for Reentry
Vehicle Attitude Control Systems" by Agustin, which details an advanced method for estimating
RCS jet and aerosurface performance and potential failures during reentry of a reusable space
vehicle, such as the space shuttle. Agustin's work used a robust two filter approach, with one
filter tuned to detect thrust levels and failures in RCS jets, and another filter tuned to detect
failures in aeronautical control surfaces. The need for two robust filters in this case arose from
significant plant and model uncertainties given the complex, unpredictable and high-speed nature
of reentry from space. In the case of the MAV, which for this report is assumed to be in free
space with negligible atmosphere, such robustness and its associated complexity are not
necessary. Therefore this method will not be used for the MAV discussed here.
One key point to note about [13] and [14] is that neither requires extra dedicated sensors
for FDI. The method for [14] was proposed primarily for FDI on the Space Shuttle, which at the
time in early stage design did not have dedicated sensors for FDI. The reason this algorithm was
not chosen for incorporation in the final Space Shuttle design is that the Shuttle experienced a
leak failure mode in which the thruster valves did not properly close when the thruster was
turned off. The resulting leak produced thrust of about 11% of nominal, and the algorithm took
over one minute to detect the failure. This was deemed to be too long, and instead the Shuttle
designers added dedicated FDI sensors on the jets to detect the leak failures and also on and off
failures, which [14] refers to as "hard failures." Leak failures were detected by temperature
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sensors at the valve, when leaking propellant froze and chilled the injectors. Off failures were
detected using chamber pressure sensors, and on failures were detected using both chamber
pressure sensors and solenoid valve current.
This research assumes that the hypothetical MAV does not have dedicated FDI sensors in
order to maintain design simplicity and decrease cost and mass. This is not uncommon in
complex space missions, where any increase in mass is an automatic increase in cost. Therefore
spacecraft are typically built with the best possible parts in the most careful way possible in order
to achieve the maximum reliability with the minimum of hardware redundancy. For example the
Apollo Guidance Computers were built with very carefully selected parts.[16] As a result, they
were highly expensive, but no Apollo Guidance Computer ever failed in use. Such maximum
quality and minimum redundancy is especially true of automated missions where no human life
is in danger from a fault or mission failure. Decreased reliability can be exchanged for greater
capability or lesser cost when the greatest danger is a loss of mission, not loss of life. Another
benefit of this research is that an adapted version could be loaded onto another existing vehicle
without additional hardware. This could be done for a large fleet of vehicles already in service,
for which retro-fitting modifications is cost prohibitive, or for a vehicle in flight, such as a
deployed space probe, where hardware modification is impossible or nearly so.
3.2 Possible Error Sources, Considerations and Assumptions
Before detailing the entire stuck valve detection algorithm, it is important to discuss
possible sources or error, how they will be dealt with, and any assumptions which are made for
this research. This section does not seek to exhaustively analyze all possible issues which could
befall a MAV in a real MSR mission, only to show that this research could be effectively applied
to a real vehicle.
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The first possible source of system errors is measurement noise and measurement error in
the MAV telemetry data, including attitude, position, angular rate, velocity, angular acceleration
and linear acceleration, which are collectively referred to as the vehicle states. Measurement
noise is any unwanted disturbance in the measurement signal which can come from a variety of
sources. Noise varies with time and is not predictable exactly at any given time, however it can
be characterized using primarily probabilistic measures, often based on the sensors and hardware
to be used. In preparation for the MSR mission, significant testing and evaluation would be
conducted on all elements and the final vehicle. Through this testing, data could be gathered and
sensors and hardware could be analyzed to estimate noise characteristics. This data could also be
combined with data and experiences from previous Mars missions to generate a best estimate of
what the MAV measurement noise characteristics will be in flight. Based on the analyzed noise
characteristics, a variety of effective filters could be designed to maintain the most accurate
possible estimations of the vehicle states.
Measurement error sources will be characterized along with measurement noise during
initial testing. One of the greatest contributors to measurement error is initialization errors,
where the initial position and attitude of the MAV would be set incorrectly based on errors in the
launch system. These errors could be minimized by increasing measurement accuracy and
redundancy in the launch system, either through sensor redundancy or inclusion of different
types of sensors, such as stellar sighting.
For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that the best possible filters and error
countermeasures are incorporated into the vehicle IMU or support electronics, and that no further
processing or noise considerations are necessary in the failure detection algorithm. The impact
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of noise will be discussed in the simulation section, however the data provided to the failure
detection algorithm will still be assumed to be the best possible estimate.
Another characteristic of the vehicle which must be taken into consideration is the fact
that valves do not turn instantly on and off when commanded. Once the valves are open, it takes
a finite amount of time for the flow of gas to form, which means it takes a finite amount of time
for the corresponding force to be applied to the vehicle. When the valve is closed, thrust falls to
zero over a finite interval. Figure 3-1 shows these characteristics. t, is the time at which the
valve is commanded on, and tb is the time at which the valve is commanded off. ton is the time
at which the valve thrust reaches its max value, and t is the time at which the valve thrust falls
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Figure 3-1: Valve Transients
This behavior can be referred to as the valve transients. In addition to significant ground testing,
one key to minimizing the impact of this characteristic of the system would be to select valves
for the MAV RCS thrusters which have significant space heritage. The combination of ground
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testing and data from previous space missions would allow the valve transients to be effectively
characterized before the mission.
The primary impact of the valve transients would be in the control law and in the stuck
valve detection algorithm. Both of these subsystems must accurately predict the jet response and
thrust which will be applied to the vehicle. Ineffective prediction or compensation for valve
transients would result in sub-optimal control and in false or incorrect stuck valve identification.
The worst case scenario would be to trigger a false valve failure indication. Therefore the
algorithm must take this into account. The first step is that no failure indication shall trigger
faster than it takes a valve to fully open or close. Other considerations could be incorporated into
the algorithm depending on the specific nature of the valve transients. Also, the valve transients
must be incorporated into the predicted change in body angular and linear rate, to be detailed
below, which is a crucial step in the detection algorithm. As long as the valve transients are
properly characterized, the predicted change in body rates can incorporate them and thereby
prevent incorrect or missed failure indications. Because valve transient characteristics can only
be determined for the particular valve and system to be used, and can be incorporated into the
existing subsystems, they will not be considered in this research. Valves will be assumed to
open instantaneously, with a corresponding instantaneous application of force and torque to the
vehicle.
The force and torque which each valve applies upon opening, however, will not be a
constant value. The force applied will vary primarily based upon the gas pressure which exists at
each valve, as it is the pressure which expels the gases from the valve and therefore exerts the
force on the vehicle. In most simple models, it is assumed that the pressure is constant across the
entire system and that the pressure at each valve is identical. In reality this will not be the case.
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The pressure at each valve may vary based on how many valves are open, and where those
valves are relative to each other. Firing a neighboring valve may cause the pressure at valve j to
drop significantly, however the instantaneous pressure at valve k may not be affected
measurably.
Solid rocket motors can also experience instabilities resulting from acoustic and pressure
oscillations.[17] This behavior has been observed in numerous space vehicles, to include the US
Space Shuttle solid rocket boosters and the European Ariane 5. These oscillations have been
successfully managed in these operational systems, however they do pose significant challenges
to the spacecraft designers and can limit options for payload or crew capability. Significant
oscillations could be dangerous to sensitive equipment and must be accurately characterized to
maintain adequate vehicle control. In a gas generator RCS, this would likely manifest as uneven
burning in the gas generator. For the purposes of this research, and based on [1] and [18], all
MAV systems, and propulsion systems in particular will be designed with the maximum possible
space heritage. This will enable the solid rocket characteristics and performance to be accurately
known beforehand and therefore well compensated for in the vehicle controller and FDI and
mitigation algorithms.
These fluid dynamics are too complex to fully predict, and are outside the scope of this
thesis. Also, the pressure will be controlled in any such real system, and possibly also
maintained at certain desired set point values for defined modes of operation. A more advanced
vehicle may also have a suite of sensors to measure pressure throughout the system, possibly
even at each valve. It can be assumed that the pressure set point for a given mode and any
measurements which feed the pressure controller will be available to the vehicle autopilot.
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Therefore this report assumes that the system and valve pressures will either be well known or
well controlled and stable enough to not negatively affect the detection algorithm.
3.3 Stuck Valve Detection Algorithm
The algorithm which was chosen and developed for this research is an adapted and
simplified version of Deyst and Deckert's algorithm. Algorithmic simplicity was the key criteria
for selecting and developing the stuck valve detection algorithm. The method detailed in [14] is
among the simplest algorithms computationally, while also being very flexible in adapting to
new vehicles and component configurations, and could also be transferred to a wide range of
other vehicles and applications. Keeping the computational load low allows the onboard
computer to be as simple as possible, which in turn enables it to be as resistant to radiation,
temperature and other disturbances as possible. Another benefit is that it requires no extra
hardware, as mentioned above, providing significant savings in cost, mass and complexity.
3.3.1 Algorithm Assumptions and Variables
Some assumptions are made in adapting the algorithm for use with the hypothetical MAV
for this research. As stated previously, the onboard IMU is assumed to contain all necessary
filters and algorithms for producing the optimal estimate of body positions, as well as angular
and linear rates and accelerations. Therefore it is not necessary to include a separate filter in the
disturbance estimation algorithm as [14] did. Also, all necessary position and attitude data is
assumed to be already available. Depending on the vehicle and the particular IMU, additional
differencing or estimation methods may be required to produce the necessary data for
disturbance estimation, however that is outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore this work also
does not include the estimate error covariance in the calculations, because all estimates are
conducted external to the failure detection algorithm.
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As stated in Chapter 1, the two vehicle failure modes to be considered are stuck on and
stuck off. Stuck on represents that the valve is firing with 100% thrust at all times, regardless of
the thruster command. Stuck off means the jet is not firing, and provides 0% thrust at all times,
even when the valve is commanded on.
The following variables will be used to describe the stuck valve detection algorithm.
Activity vectors represent the expected instantaneous acceleration from each jet. The activity
vector for each jet is a six-element vector, with the first three elements representing rotational
acceleration, and the last three elements representing linear acceleration. Substituting for the
variables to be used in this research, [14] begins with the failure likelihood for jet j defined as:
af 
-lfl#
f =l (3-1)f 
-T PVl 
-aj
where #l is the estimated disturbance acceleration and Pg- is the disturbance acceleration
estimate error covariance. Incorporating estimation error was necessary in the reference because
vehicle angular and translational acceleration values were not available in real time and had to be
estimated. This algorithm assumes that all necessary data is available in real time and does no
estimation external to the IMU. Therefore the estimation error covariance Pg can be assumed to
be the six by six identity vector. The likelihood of failure for jet j can then be simplified as:
f; =(3-2)
aj aj
For the algorithm to be described below, two separate on and off failure likelihoods shall
be maintained. f;"f shall be the likelihood that jet j is stuck off and f/"" shall be the likelihood
that jetj is stuck on. These variables are used to set the failure indication variables, Jfai and
pfail jfail is a Boolean vector of sixteen elements, representing whether each jet has failed.
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pfail is also a sixteen element vector whose elements vary from 0 to 1, representing the
percentage of thrust that the jet is firing with at all times, between 0% and 100%.
In order to prevent an error at a single time step from triggering a false failure indication,
the variables L , L2 ,L and LT shall represent the stuck on and stuck off pushdown lists
which are used to estimate that a jet has failed. If n is the sequential number of the current time
step, pushdown list L*f represents the 16-element vector of off failure likelihood estimates from
time step n - 1. The corresponding elements of each pushdown list are updated only when each
individual jet is tested for either an off or an on failure, i.e. either when that jet is or is not
commanded to fire, respectively. In this way, an accurate estimate of failure likelihood can be
maintained during extended periods when a particular jet is not tested for one or the other type of
failure.
3.3.2 Algorithm Description
The primary steps of the algorithm are as follows:
1. Set new pushdowns as old values from memory to ensure there is not an empty value in
memory in case of an algorithm error or premature loop break. That is:
L -(n) = L*f(n - 1) (3-3)
Lof (n) = L*ff(n - 1) (3-4)
Lon(n) = L**(n - 1) (3-5)
Lon(n) = Lon(n - 1) (3-6)
2. Develop an estimate of the disturbance acceleration acting on the vehicle, 8. The
primary method for doing this is to compare the expected change in rotational and linear
body rates, AWpred and AVpred respectively, with the actual change in body rates
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measured by the IMU, Aw and Av. Aapred and AVPred are calculated by the autopilot
and mitigation logic according to equations (3-7), (3-8) and (3-9) and then given to the
failure detection algorithm. C is assumed to be the consecutive list of all jets which are to
be fired at the given time step, and Ts is the system sample or cycle time.
[Ao - Apred (3-7(AV - AvPred)I
Aopred = Ia (1: 3) (3-8)
j=C
Appred = a (4: 6) (3-9)j=C
3. For all jets 1 through 16
a. If jet j is commanded, update jff, and Loff and L" for that jet
ff _ (Vj + L +fLf ) (3-10)
S 1 3
L" (n) = L (n) (3-11)
L (n) = f; (3-12)
b. If jet j is not commanded, update fi, and L*" and L2 for that jet
(f + L on + L *13
f.on= 3 -13)
Lo" (n) = L*" (n) (3-14)
L**(n =j (3-15)
c. Set fail, the Boolean failure flag and P.fail, the percentage failure
i. If fo" > fron
1. Then f ail =1 p fail -1
45
ii. if of < fff
f ail pfail1. ThenJ4 =1, P =0
Some important notes on the stuck valve detection algorithm are as follows. First, the
pushdown lists as described here are used for simplicity. Iterating the failure detection and
compensating for noise or error sources could also be done with a Kalman-type filter or
estimation methods such as recursive least squares At present it is assumed that the onboard
IMU provides navigation data of sufficient quality that such noise considerations are not
required, however this could be adapted or expanded upon in future work. Setting the threshold
values is also very important. For this research, f;?ff = -0.8 and fy"" = 0.8, so for both on and
off failures 80% was considered to be the threshold for detection of a full on or off failure. This
was determined to be acceptable based on the noise considerations that were made in the final
simulation and the vehicle characteristics. Also, with the pushdown lists, disturbance
accelerations at two successive time steps would result in failure indications foff or fon =
0.667, so the detection threshold needed to be above this value to allow the algorithm to work
properly. If more pushdown lists or a noise filter were added, or if the algorithm were adapted to
a new vehicle, new threshold values would need to be established, however 80% is suggested as
an initial value for analysis.
Also, the disturbance vector may need to be scaled. If the translational and angular
components of the individual jet activity vectors are of different scale, one may overshadow the
other and dominate the likelihood estimation. A simple numerical example can illustrate this.
For the hypothetical MAV, the magnitude of a jet l's expected rotational acceleration along the
Y-axis may be 13 deg/s 2, and the expected linear acceleration may be 0.2 m/s2 along the X-axis,
nearly two orders of magnitude smaller in simple numerical value. Changing the units, such as
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using radians instead of degrees, could also have a similar effect. In an on failure situation, the
vehicle may be experiencing disturbance acceleration which matches the failure signature of jet
1, and produces a failure indication fif" of 1.000 for that time step. Because the rotational
component of jet 7's activity vector is nearly identical to that of jet 1, the failure indication for jet
7 would equal 0.9997 in this case. This is essentially indistinguishable from the correct failure
indication for valve 1, and is obviously above the threshold for detection, so therefore valve 7
would be flagged as failed along with valve 1. This shows that the choice of units and relative
magnitudes for rotation and translation could produce false or inaccurate failure indications.
Therefore the translation and rotation elements of both the disturbance and activity
vectors must be scaled by their relative magnitudes in order to balance the failure likelihood
calculation and adequately distinguish each jet. In all cases, the change to the disturbance vector
can be calculated as follows:
1a(1: 3)|
'P- = (3-16)1ai (4: 6)1
S=(AV - Appred) , (3-17)
l ct1(1: 3)
a'= .(:)q](3-18)C1 [ay (4: 6) -Wp]
where Aopred and AVpred represent the predicted change in body angular and linear rate,
respectively, and are calculated based on which jets are selected to be fired by the autopilot. f'
is the augmented disturbance vector and a! is the augmented jet activity vector. The
augmentation ratio cpy is calculated separately for each jet because the disparity between linear
and angular control authority is different for each jet. In some vehicles, such as the hypothetical
MAV in this research, jets of the same type, such as all those that produce X-axis linear
47
acceleration and Y and Z-axis angular acceleration, may have the same augmentation ratio. If
vehicle mass properties are not constant, particularly the inertia tensor and center of mass
distribution, the augmentation ratio may change for individual jets relative to others, and
therefore the ratios must be calculated for each jet at each time step.
Based on the above equations, Equation (3) can be updated as follows:
' - aT , (3-19)
Where f;' represents the augmented failure indication. Equations (3-10), (3-12), (3-13) and (3-
15) can then be augmented to include f;' in place of f1 .
3.4 Valve Isolation
One key problem faced by many FDI systems is not only determining that a fault or
failure has occurred, but also isolating that failure to its correct source. This is the purpose of the
separate off and on failure detection variables in Section 3.3, in order to isolate which jet has
failed. During one particular time step, a failed on jet will produce the exact same disturbance
acceleration as if its opposing jet is commanded on but is failed off. Since firing opposing
thrusters simultaneously produces no net force or torque and only expends unnecessary fuel, it
can be assumed that any viable autopilot and jet selection method would not command this
directly. Opposing thrusters may be fired to release system pressure without applying any net
force or torque to the vehicle, and this particular behavior could be added to the predicted body
motion calculations and other elements of the algorithm. With this assumption, testing jets for
on failures only when they are not commanded, and testing jets for off failures only when they
are commanded, enables the direct isolation of which jet has failed and what failure mode it is
experiencing, either on or off.
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3.5 Multiple Simultaneous Failures
The arrangement of valves for the simulation is described in Chapter 5. The first eight
valves control motion in the X-axis of translation and the Y and Z-axes of rotation and may be
referred to as type 1 valves. The second eight valves control motion in the Y and Z-axes of
translation and the X-axis of rotation, and may be referred to as type 2 valves. As previously
stated, this research is limited to detecting only a single failure at any one time. The current
algorithm is, however, capable of detecting and correctly identifying certain combinations of
simultaneous failures, because the activity vectors of type 1 and 2 jets are completely disparate in
six-dimensional space. An on failure of a type 1 jet can be detected at the same time as an off
failure of a type 2 jet, and an off failure of a type 1 jet can be detected at the same time as an on
failure of a type 2 jet.
It is obvious from the previous discussion that simultaneous on and off failures of jets of
the same type cannot be accurately detected, because at a given time step an off failure of a jet
appears identical to an on failure of its opposing jet. The ability to detect these particular types
of simultaneous on and off failures is an artifact of the current algorithm design and is not
sufficient to say that the algorithm can adequately handle multiple simultaneous failures. It adds
a small level of robustness to the algorithm and shows the potential for extension of these




Disturbance mitigation should be handled differently for the on and off failure modes.
The primary issues to consider with each failure mode are: how to counteract (mitigate) the
disturbance acceleration from the failure, how best to remove the failed jet from the simplex
selection options, and how to deal with intermittent failures.
4.1.1 Stuck On Failure
As described before, the hypothetical MAV has sixteen jets arranged in eight opposed
pairs. For on failures, the most obvious solution is to fire the opposing jet continuously in order
to oppose the disturbance. For jet selection, in this case both the failed and the opposing jet
would be removed from the jet options in Simplex. This does, however, present a problem,
because removing two jets places extra constraints on Simplex, and in some cases Simplex may
be unable to find a solution for the desired rate change request. Also, the vehicle autopilot may
wish to take the vehicle in the direction which the on failed jet is thrusting, however the opposing
jet's mitigation is removing any possible benefit.
The solution to this is to alter the mitigation and jet selection slightly to take maximum
advantage of the stuck jet and to limit the constraints on Simplex. In this new scheme, the
opposing jet is still fired, and only that opposing jet is removed from the options in Simplex.
The failed jet itself remains as an option for Simplex to choose. If the failed jet is commanded,
the opposing jet is turned off for as long as the failed jet is commanded on. Therefore the net
force and torque on the vehicle at that moment are the same as commanding the failed jet, and
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the opposing jet fires only when necessary to counteract unwanted disturbance. In this way, the
vehicle can achieve the maximum possible controllability in the presence of a failure.
The problem of intermittent on failures is significant. Continuously firing the opposing
jet when the failed jet disturbance has gone away would be as detrimental to vehicle performance
and controllability as was the original failure. Therefore the detection and mitigation algorithms
as previously described are capable of detecting and correcting for intermittent on failures, and
an example of this is included in the simulation section. If the on failure stops and the jet goes
back to normal, the disturbance acceleration goes away. The opposing jet does not appear as a
disturbance because the autopilot incorporates the expected acceleration from the opposing jet
into Aopred and AvPred in order to maintain the correct disturbance estimation even when the
opposing jet is exactly counteracting the on failed jet. As the disturbance from the failed jet goes
away, so does the failure indication f;"". Therefore the opposing jet is turned off as soon as the
failure indication f;"" drops below the threshold fT"-, a new threshold value which is lower than
f7f". If the opposing jet were turned off every time the failure indication ff"" dropped below the
original threshold ff", an on failure with thrust of the same percentage as the threshold value
would cause the failure flag to oscillate, producing erratic and undesirable vehicle behavior.
Following this the vehicle returns to normal operation until another failure is detected.
4.1.2 Stuck Off Failure
The primary method for stuck off failure mitigation is simply to remove that jet from the
list of options available to the Simplex jet selection algorithm. The effect of a stuck off failure is
less dramatic than a stuck on failure because the disturbance only appears when the jet is
commanded. When an off failure is detected, however, it is important that the jet is taken away
from Simplex in order to improve performance. If the jet is not removed from the list of jet
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options in Simplex, Simplex will likely try to fire that jet, since it acts directly along the
disturbance vector which its failure has created. This can have very detrimental consequences
for vehicle control, as evident in Section 5.3.5.
The algorithm as currently implemented and described here is not capable of detecting
that a previously failed off jet has returned to normal operation. A simple update to the
mitigation strategy would allow for intermittent off failure correction. A test can be
implemented to determine if Simplex cannot find a solution to the current rate change request
with the available jets. If this test is triggered, the off failure flag for that jet can be reset in order
to give the jet back to Simplex. If the jet is subsequently commanded and does not fire, the
disturbance acceleration will appear again and the failure flag will again be reset. If the jet is
commanded and does fire, the vehicle can continue and return to normal operation. The off
failed jet may or may not be the reason that Simplex is unable to find a solution for the current
rate change. Returning the failed jet in this way ensures that an off failure detected early in a
mission does not permanently remove the jet from use if the jet returns to normal functionality,
and increases the chances of Simplex finding a viable solution to a given rate change request.
An alternative option would be to design dedicated sets of jet firings which could be triggered as
necessary by the autopilot in order to detect off failed jets and determine if a previously off failed




Research simulations were conducted using Matlab and Simulink. The heart of the
simulation is a generic six degree-of-freedom equations of motion simulator developed at the
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory. The simulator receives inputs of force F and torque or
moment M acting on the body, and parameters of vehicle mass m and inertia I, and derivatives
and d. The vehicle mass properties can be changed during a test run by either changing the
dm dI
values of m and I as the simulation progresses, or setting nonzero values for and .
As described in Chapter 1, the proposed representative Mars Ascent Vehicle has sixteen
jets arranged into eight opposed pairs, which are capable of controlling motion in any of the six
degrees of freedom. The vehicle is one redundant, meaning that any one failure does not result
in loss of vehicle control, however there exists at least one set of two failures that could render
the vehicle uncontrollable in at least one degree of freedom.
The MAV as described in [18] will likely be a nearly-cylindrical, two-stage rocket
approximately 2.5 to 3 m tall. Some versions of the MAV are proposed to be stored horizontally
in the base of the lander for space conservation and sample loading and then lifted vertically for
launch. The first stage rocket will boost the payload off the Mars surface and on a trajectory for
Mars orbit. The second stage will be responsible for placing the sample into the proper orbit for
rendezvous with the Earth Return Vehicle (ERV). The most recent published design calls for the
second stage to be a solid rocket motor with limited orbit accuracy and a small liquid RCS. This
research considers the second stage as a six degree-of-freedom RCS for greater orbit accuracy
and control, and for greater applicability of the algorithms to other vehicle applications.
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The configuration considered here shall be a narrow cylinder, with length 1.3 m and radius 0.35
m, with the sample along the long axis near the nose, the sixteen jets arranged around the edge of
the cylinder, and the electronics and gas generator hardware inside the cylinder. The vehicle X
axis shall be along the centerline of the body's long axis, with the positive X axis being
nominally vertical at the time of MAV launch. The positive Y axis shall bisect the vehicle IMU,
and the Z axis shall be orthogonal to both the X and Y axes. In order to achieve orbit control and
accurately place the Mars sample into orbit, eight of the jets (four of the opposed pairs) will be
larger than the other eight, and will be pointed along the X axis. In this way, they shall be
capable of controlling linear motion along the X axis, and rotation about the Y and Z axes. The
eight smaller jets shall be placed along the edge of the vehicle, perpendicular to the X axis, in
order to control Y and Z axis linear motion and X axis rotation. The following table shows the
numbered jets and which axes they exert force or torque along or about. Appropriate values for
mass and jet force are used, based on [18]:
Jet Number Force Torque Jet Number Force Torque
1 +X +Y, -Z 9 -Y, +Z +X
2 +X +Y, +Z 10 -Y, -Z +X
3 +X -Y, +Z 11 +Y, -Z +X
4 +X -Y, -Z 12 +Y, +Z +X
5 -X -Y, +Z 13 +Y, -Z -X
6 -X -Y, -Z 14 +Y, +Z -X
7 -X +Y, -Z 15 -Y, +Z -X
8 -X +Y, +Z 16 -Y, -Z -X
Table 5-1: Jet Forces and Torques
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5.2 Test Methodology
For the test cases detailed here, the simulation is run at a sample rate of T, = 100 Hz.
The phase space control law, Simplex jet selection method, and failure detection algorithm are
all run at this same rate. A separate function is used to convert firing times, jet lists, and jet
failure indications into correct force and torque applications to the vehicle equations of motion
simulator.
The phase space control law is implemented only to zero rate and position errors and
return the vehicle to the desired state. Maneuvers are executed by changing the vehicle desired
state at specific points in time. Detection performance is evaluated primarily on two criteria:
detection accuracy and detection time. If a failure is correctly identified, the goal detection time
is one second, in order to prevent loss of vehicle control and allow sufficient time for mitigation
to take effect. The larger jets apply approximately 13 deg/s 2 in angular acceleration about the Y
and Z-axes. Unmitigated, this will result in an undesired vehicle motion of 6.5 degrees after one
second, and 26 degrees after two seconds. If it is assumed that the mitigation will take effect
within one second after the failure flag is triggered, then a detection time of one second means
that a failure should be fully mitigated within two seconds. This ensures that the vehicle is back
under control before it has departed significantly from its desired course.
Appropriate amounts of noise were added to the simulated IMU measurements to
represent a real system. The intent is to show that the algorithms still function well in the
presence of noise and imperfect measurements. The noise is implemented as band-limited white
noise, added to the linear and angular acceleration measurements within the six degree of
freedom equations of motions simulator. The acceleration measurements are then integrated to
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produce the linear and angular rates and positions, thereby carrying the noise into those
measurements as well.
5.3 Test Cases
Unless otherwise stated, the test cases detailed here are based on the following maneuver.
The maneuver begins with a +Y rotation, followed by +Z rotation, and then the failure occurs at
t = 30 sec. The failure is followed by +X translation, 50 second hold, then a three axis rotation
with +X, -Y (return to 0 degrees), and -Z (return to 0 degrees). The final maneuver is a - X
translation to return to 0 meters at t = 150 sec.
5.3.1 Nominal Case

















Figure 5-1: Vehicle Linear Position
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Figure 5-4: Angular Disturbance Acceleration
The nominal, no failure case is shown to establish a baseline against which to compare
the remaining simulations and test cases. A few important characteristics should be noted. First,
the reader should note the shape and pattern of Figures 5-1 and 5-2. The same maneuver is used
for the following test cases unless otherwise noted. Also, readers who are not familiar with the
phase space concept should briefly study Figure 5-3 in order to accurately interpret the meaning.
Remember that region 3 is outside the deadband, and region 2 is the outer perimeter of the
deadband which triggers a new jet selection request. In this no failure case, the excursions into
region 3 occur when a new desired state is set, i.e. a maneuver is commanded. The oscillations
between regions 1 and 2 are evidence of the phase space controller limit cycling behavior. Here
the vehicle states are not precisely controlled at their desired value, but instead move out into
region 2 before being controlled back towards the desired state, and then overshooting or being
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disturbed away from the desired state. Finally, the noise characteristics can be seen easily in the
nominal case. The measurement noise was implemented in the vehicle translational and linear
accelerations, so therefore it is most evident in the acceleration plot Figure 5-4. The noise is less
evident in the position plots Figures 5-1 and 5-2 because much of it has been integrated, which
tends to smooth out the noise. The noise is not an insignificant consideration, however, when
estimating vehicle disturbance and thruster failures, and will be discussed in the following
simulations.
5.3.2 On Failure
The first test case is of valve 3 failed on:
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Figure 5-5: Vehicle Linear Position
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Figure 5-7: Phase Space Region
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Figure 5-8: Angular Disturbance Acceleration
Disturbance Estimation and On Failure Indication
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Figure 5-8 shows the rotational disturbance acceleration estimate, and Figure 5-9 shows
the rotational disturbance acceleration estimates in Y and Z rotation, the axes about which valve
3 exerts torque. It is evident from these figures that the failure occurs at t = 30 sec, and that the
algorithm detects the failure almost immediately. The mitigation is successful, which is obvious
from Figures 5-5, 5-6 and 5-7. Figure 5-5 shows the vehicle linear position in inertial space, and
Figure 5-6 shows the body angular position, measured in the body frame. Figure 3 shows the
vehicle's position relative to the three phase space regions. The success of the mitigation is
evident from the lack of disturbance in the simulation figures. A significant disturbance is not
evident in translation or rotation at t = 30 sec, and the vehicle never leaves region 1 or 2 at this
time, meaning that none of the six position states have exceeded their deadband.
5.3.3 Intermittent On Failure
The algorithms are also capable of detecting and properly mitigating an intermittent on
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Figure 5-10: Vehicle Linear Position
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Figure 5-14: Angular Disturbance and Failure Indication
As is evident from the Figures 5-13 and 5-14, valve 3 is failed on from time t = 30 sec
to t = 90 sec, after which it returns to normal operation. If the detection and mitigation
algorithms were not capable of identifying the change in disturbance acceleration and valve 3's
return to normal operation, the opposing jet would continue to fire unnecessarily, and would
itself cause a disturbance acceleration on the vehicle. Because the intermittent failure is
adequately detected, the vehicle is able to return to nominal operation following the failure.
5.3.4 Valve 5 Failed Off


















Figure 5-15: Vehicle Linear Position




































Figure 5-17: Phase Space Region
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Figure 5-19: Angular Disturbance and Failure Indication
Here the failure occurs at the same time while executing the same series of maneuvers as
in Section 5.3.2 above. What is most interesting to note is that the failure indication does not
trigger immediately, because the off failure mode is only evident when the failed valve is
commanded. The time scale of Figure 5-19 is shortened to better show this. Valve 5 is
commanded on for two time steps soon after the failure, so the likelihood of failure fs"f =
0.667, however not above the detection threshold ff = 0.8, so the failure indication flag and is
not set and the valve remains available for the jet selection algorithm. A few seconds later, valve
5 is again commanded on, and because the jet does not fire, the corresponding disturbance
acceleration appears for the third time, the likelihood of failure for valve 5, fsJ" = 1.0 > ff" =
0.8 and the off failure indication flag is set for valve 5, that is jsrai, = 1 and P fail = 0.
6 5
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Following this, valve 5 is removed from the jet selection algorithm and it is not selected again
throughout the remaining time of this simulation.
5.3.5 Off Failure Not Removed from Simplex Selection,
The following example shows what happens when an off failure is not removed from the
choices for the Simplex basis.
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Figure 5-21: Vehicle Angular Position
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Figure 5-23: Angular Disturbance Acceleration
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On initial inspection an off failure appears to be a relatively minor inconvenience to the
system, because it is a passive disturbance that only appears whenever that valve is commanded
open. The above plots show, however, that removing the failed jet from the Simplex selection
basis is an essential step. If the jet is not removed, certain formulations of Simplex, such as the
one used for this research, may continue to command the jet and be unable to achieve the desired
maneuver. There are obviously other combinations ofjets which could have accomplished the
maneuver, however the failed jet was heavily favored by Simplex, and therefore the vehicle is
not able to accomplish the desired maneuver.
5.3.6 Asymmetric Mass Properties
In the previous examples the mass distribution of the MAV is assumed to be fairly
uniform. For the following example, the mass is distributed asymmetrically, as if the Mars
sample is exceptionally large. The mass properties are also updated in the flight control and
failure detection algorithms, which is essential for maintaining adequate control of the vehicle
and accurately detecting valve failures. Here valve 3 fails on thirty seconds into the simulation,
just as several of the previous examples.
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Figure 5-25: Vehicle Linear Position
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Figure 5-27: Phase Space Region
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Figure 5-29: Angular Disturbance and Failure Indication
Overall the above simulation shows that the control and detection algorithms which are
used are still effective at controlling the vehicle, and detecting and mitigating failures, even when
the mass properties have changed significantly. The vehicle control characteristics are slightly
different, as is evident from the slightly different motion of the vehicles through the maneuvers.
This is most evident in the phase space regions of Figure 5-29, where the vehicle motion
between regions 1, 2, and 3 is different from previous simulation cases. The simple explanation
for this is that the vehicle control authority and activity vectors have changed for each jet, so











5.3.7 Asymmetric Mass Properties Not Updated in Autopilot
In the following example, the vehicle mass properties are the same as in Section 5.3.6,
however the changes are not updated in the flight controls or detection algorithms. The mass
property values in the autopilot and detection algorithms are the same as in Sections 5.3.1
through 5.3.5. This is representative of if no mass property estimation algorithm were included
on the final vehicle, or if there were no way to measure the sample mass properties on the Mars
surface prior to launch. As in Section 5.3.6, valve 3 fails on thirty seconds into the simulation.
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Figure 5-31: Phase Space Region
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Figure 5-33: Angular Disturbance and Failure Indication
When the mass properties are not updated in the autopilot and the detection algorithms,
they appear as a disturbance on the vehicle. As discussed previously, the disturbance is the
difference between the vehicle's expected motion and its actual motion. The vehicle is not
moving as expected, and the disturbance is amplified because the mass properties have not been
updated. In this case the vehicle is still controllable and the detection algorithm is still
successful, however it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a failure to update mass
properties could prevent the vehicle from accomplishing its mission.
5.3.8 Partial On Failure or External Disturbance
An additional simulation is included to show the behavior of the phase space controller
and failure algorithms in the presence of a partial on failure, which is the same as for a small
external disturbance. Here valve 7 is failed on at 15% thrust.
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Figure 5-34: Vehicle Linear Position
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5-38: Angular Disturbance and Failure Indication
While it is limited to disturbances significantly less than an individual jet activity vector,
the phase space control law is capable of compensating for small disturbances. This
performance is the same for a jet failed partially on as for a small external disturbance, such as
gravity gradient or aerodynamic drag. The phase space region plot, Figure 5-36, shows the limit
cycling behavior of the vehicle in response to the disturbance, where the vehicle rapidly
alternates between regions 1, 2 and 3 throughout much of the simulation. It is important to note,
however, that the vehicle remains controllable at all times and does successfully complete the
desired maneuvers.
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6.0 Conclusions and Future Work
These algorithms provide an effective means of increasing robustness and mitigating risk
for a solid fuel six degree-of-freedom RCS, such as may be used on the Mars Ascent Vehicle
stage of the Mars Sample Return mission. They can detect, isolate and mitigate failures without
additional hardware, and with minimal computing load. This provides a significant gain in
reliability and robustness to failure without adding additional cost, complexity or mass, which
are all essential to any space mission. As the ambition, and therefore the size, mass, complexity,
and range of unmanned space programs continues to grow over time, strategies such as this that
increase mission reliability and save on expense will become increasingly relevant.
These results show that the algorithms as described can effectively detect and mitigate
single valve failures in a solid fuel reaction control system. The mitigation strategy as described
is very effective at reducing the effects of either an on or an off failure. An added benefit is that
off-modulating the opposed jet when an on-failed jet is commanded allows for maximum
possible control authority in the presence of a failure. Additionally, these algorithms are
intended for computational efficiency, and are designed to be implemented on the processing-
constrained, space-qualified computers which would be used for the MSR mission.
Not just applicable to the described MSR mission and MAV, this research could be
applied to a wide variety of vehicles and applications in which expected and actual state changes
can be differentiated to detect and isolate failures.
The most immediate future work on this topic is to find algorithms for FDI and
mitigation for partial on failures and off-nominal thrust. These failure modes cannot be
adequately detected and counteracted using the algorithms as described. With slight
modification, however, the detection algorithm could be made to work for these cases, and the
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principles of the mitigation algorithm would remain the same. Also, the described addition
should be made to the algorithm to better detect intermittent off failures. A longer term future
goal should be to detect multiple simultaneous failures. This should be achievable within the
algorithm framework developed in this thesis, though it will require significant additional
research.
An additional future topic would be to include state estimation for sensor measurement
noise and measurement error. This thesis assumes that the measurements and data provided by
the vehicle IMU are the best available, however every IMU will have certain noise and error
characteristics, including traditional noise and other sources such as bias and gyro drift.
Countermeasures for these error sources could be added to the support electronics and signal
processing suite, or directly into the detection and mitigation algorithms, as necessary for the
particular application. This would help to improve the overall performance of the system,
especially in consideration of the limitations of modem sensors.
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